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INTELLIGENT DESIGN,
IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY, AND MINDS—
A REPLY TO JOHN BEAUDOIN
Elliott Sober

In my paper "Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural—the 'God or
Extra-Terrestrial' Reply," I argued that Intelligent Design (ID) Theory, when
coupled with independently plausible further assumptions, leads to the con
clusion that a supernatural intelligent designer exists. ID theory is therefore
not neutral on the question of whether there are supernatural agents. In this
respect, it differs from the Darwinian theory of evolution. John Beaudoin
replies to my paper in his "Sober on Intelligent Design Theory and the Intel
ligent Designer," arguing that my paper faces two challenges. In the present
paper, I try to address Beaudoin's challenges.

John Beaudoin1 offers two objections to my argument2 that Intelligent
Design (ID) theory is not neutral on the question of whether there are
supernatural designers. The first concerns my claim that the central thesis
of ID theory is that
(1) If a system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was
caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
The second concerns my assertion that
(2) Some of the minds found in nature are irreducibly complex.
Beaudoin doubts that (1) is ID theory's central thesis; with respect to (2), he
points out that Michael Behe3 "seems not to grant, at least not explicitly"
that the concept of irreducible complexity applies to minds. Beaudoin's
point, I take it, is that only physical systems can be irreducibly complex.
Beaudoin offers three reasons for thinking that "Behe does not mean to
include minds" when he discusses irreducible complexity:
(i) Behe doesn't cite minds as examples of irreducibly complex systems.
(ii) Behe requires that the parts of an irreducibly complex system must
be "well matched," and Beaudoin contends that the relation of
well-matching is spatial.
(iii) Behe says that irreducible complexity is a sign of ID when it is
found in physical systems that have physically interacting parts.
Points (i) and (iii) do not touch my claim that (2) is true and that ID theo
rists are obliged to grant this. Whether Behe intended for his definition of
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irreducible complexity to have the consequence that minds can be irreducibly complex is not germane. With respect to (iii), Behe's claiming that ir
reducible complexity in a physical system suffices to establish the existence
of an intelligent designer does not show that he thinks that the system's
being physical is necessary for the concept of irreducible complexity to ap
ply. As for (ii), I don't agree that "being well matched" is a spatial relation.
Two thoughts in a theory can be well-matched in the sense of being wellsuited to each other. The same goes for two people in love.
Beaudoin offers one more piece of evidence concerning what Behe
intended. After making point (iii), he says that "where the parts of the
system do not physically interact, Behe states [that] the intervention of
intelligence must be detected 'in other ways,'" and here Beaudoin refers to
a footnote in Darwin's Black Box in which Behe discusses "patterns of coin
flips or other systems that do not physically interact."4 This is the stron
gest textual evidence that Beaudoin presents, but the fact remains that
Behe defined irreducible complexity without requiring that the system be
physical. He says that an irreducibly complex system is "a single system
composed of several well-matched interacting parts that contribute to the
basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the
system to effectively cease functioning."5
Beaudoin considers whether it would arbitrary for the ID theorist to
restrict proposition (1) to physical systems. He says that it might not be if
we know less about the mind than we do about biochemistry. There are
two questions here. Do we know enough about a mind to tell whether it
is irreducibly complex? On the assumption that something is irreducibly
complex, are we entitled to conclude from this that it was produced by
an intelligent designer? I think it is clear enough that a mind found in
nature that is capable of planning and fashioning an irreducibly complex
system must itself be irreducibly complex. If ID theorists grant this, but
then doubt whether we can conclude that this irreducibly complex mind
was intelligently designed, then I am puzzled why they would be entitled
to take the supposition that the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex
to show that it was intelligently designed.
In none of his three replies does Beaudoin address the positive argu
ment I gave for thinking that (2) is true. A mind that designs and builds
an irreducibly complex system (that's the relevant way in which a de
signer would bring an irreducibly complex structure into existence) has
a function and the designer's mind couldn't perform that function if any
of its interacting parts were excised. Consider, for example, the mind of
a watchmaker as he designs and builds a watch. He has a set of beliefs
and desires from which he formulates a plan; then he executes the plan
by initiating actions, using his perceptual faculties to monitor how the
project is going and perhaps modifying his plan along the way. The func
tion (or, at least, a function) of the watchmaker's mind is to allow him to
deal effectively with his environment; if you remove the watchmaker's
beliefs, or desires, or intentions, or perceptual states, or memories, his
mind will be unable to do this. Beaudoin raises the interesting question
of how (2) is related to various positions on the mind/body problem. I
am inclined to think that dualists and physicalists should both grant that
(2) is true.
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There is room to wonder whether other function claims about the
watchmaker's mind might also be true. In addition, one might wonder
exactly how the watchmaker's process of planning and building should be
segmented into parts. However, if either of these questions is thought to
undermine my assessment of the watchmaker's mind, why don't the same
questions undermine Behe's assessment of the bacterial flagellum? This is
the point I tried to make in my discussion of the wine bottle problem.6
Given his assessment of proposition (2), Beaudoin proposes that propo
sition (1) be restricted, the result being the thesis that
(1*) If a physical system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it
was caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
Beaudoin's other challenge to my argument is his claim that even (1*) isn't
the central thesis of ID theory. Rather, he thinks that (1*) "plays a central
role in a justification for intelligent design theory that most design theo
rists use." In his view, "design theorists advance multiple arguments for
their view, some of which don't use (1*), or they do not make an argument
with (1*) carrying all or most of the evidential burden." For Beaudoin, the
trouble with (1*) is that irreducible complexity plays a merely epistemo
logical role in the ID framework7 and constitutes just one line of evidence
among several for intelligent design.
If (1*) isn't the central ID thesis, what is? Beaudoin thinks the central the
sis is that some structures in nature (e.g., the bacterial flagellum) are prod
ucts of ID. Let us divide this proposition in two—there is the claim that
some structures in nature are produced by ID and the claim that the bacte
rial flagellum is an example. The first of these is uncontroversial. No one
doubts that watches and cars exist because of intelligent design. And even
if we beef up this first conjunct and consider the claim that some biological
structures are products of ID (I think this was Beaudoin's intent), the claim
is still uncontroversial. It is not in dispute that plant and animal breeders
have fashioned a variety of biological systems via artificial selection. Does
this mean that the only thing that is nontrivial in ID theory is the second
conjunct—the claim about the bacterial flagellum (and presumably other
examples)? I don't read Paley8 or Behe in this way. True, each discusses a
number of examples. But in each case, the examples are supposed to il
lustrate a general principle; this is what (1*) helps codify. Paley and Behe
would be within their rights to say that their main argument goes through
even if the details of a few of their examples turn out to be off the mark.
I agree that there might be ID arguments that are not based on the
concept of irreducible complexity; Beaudoin says that some ID theorists
have developed arguments of this sort. However, this is not enough to
undermine the argument I made in my paper. As long as (1) is part of
the theory, the theory leads (once independently plausible assumptions
are taken into account) to the conclusion that a supernatural intelligent
designer exists. ID theorists who wish to avoid this consequence need to
expunge (1) from their theory; supplementing it with other arguments for
ID does no good. It doesn't matter whether (1) is central or peripheral or
whether it is epistemological or substantive.
Beaudoin mentions that ID theory might be fragmented into a number
of separate theories, each composed of a different argument but always
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for the same conclusion. The result that Beaudoin has in mind is that only
some of the resulting theories will have supernatural consequences. It is
noteworthy that Beaudoin does not himself view ID theory in this way; for
him, the theory is a single proposition that might be supported by mul
tiple arguments. Surely nothing much should depend on whether we say
that there is one ID theory that has different arguments attached to it or
that there are many ID theories. I therefore accept Beaudoin's suggestion
that my argument applies, in the first instance, to versions of ID theory
that use the concept of irreducible complexity. The question then needs to
be considered of whether an Aquinas-style argument similar to the one I
constructed applies to other versions as well.9
University of Wisconsin, Madison

NOTES
1. In John Beaudoin, “Sober on Intelligent Design and the Intelligent De
signer," Faith and Philosophy 25.4 (2008), pp. 432-42.
2. In Elliott Sober, “Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural—the
'God or Extra-Terrestrial' Reply," Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 72-82.
3. For example, in Darwin's Black Box (New York: Free Press, 1996).
4. Ibid, p. 285, note 3.
5. Ibid, p. 39.
6. Sober, p. 75.
7. But later in the paper, Beaudoin says that “it is reasonable to say that
the theory . . . encompasses the methodological principles that are used . . . to
identify structures as intelligently designed."
8. William Paley, Natural Theology, or, Evidences o f the Existence and Attri
butes o f the Deity, Collected from the Appearances o f Nature (London: Rivington,
1802).
9. My thanks to John Beaudoin and Joel Velasco for useful discussion.

